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Jury service is an important opportunity for citizens to participate in 
the democratic process, embracing those who may not otherwise have the 
opportunity to be involved with civic life.  This opportunity allows 
members of the community to exercise their responsibility of citizenship.  
A recent survey revealed that two-thirds of American citizens believe 
serving on a jury “is part of what it means to be a good citizen.”1   
To protect this opportunity, equal justice under law requires that 
criminal trials be free from racial discrimination in jury selection process.  
Discrimination in the process offends the rights of citizens and defendants 
and hinders the integrity of the courts.  Despite the efforts of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution to demand fair and equal 
treatment to all persons, racial discrimination persisted throughout the 
decades, which was due in large to the use of the peremptory strike that 
permits exclusion of a juror without explanation.  To reconcile this, the 
United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky developed a framework 
that requires parties to offer race-neutral explanations for a contested 
strike.2  However, many scholars and commentators have criticized the 
decision for its failure to eradicate racial discrimination in jury selection.  
Recently, the Supreme Court revisited the application of Fourteenth 
Amendment principles to jury selection in Flowers v. Mississippi.3   The 
death row case required the Court to review the extraordinary facts 
stemming from all of Flowers’ six trials.  The Court’s decision hinged on 
the single issue of whether the State of Mississippi violated Flowers’ 
 
    * Sonya Dickson is a 2021 graduate of Mississippi College School of Law.  
The author would like to thank Mississippi College School of Law Professor Matthew 
Steffey for his support and guidance throughout the drafting of this Comment.  The author 
would also like to thank her family and friends for all their love, support, and 
encouragement.  
    1. John Gramlich, Jury Duty is Rare, but Most Americans See it as Part of 
Good Citizenship, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-but-most-
americans-see-it-as-part-of-good-citizenship/.   
    2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
    3. Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).  
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Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding a prospective African 
American juror from the jury in his sixth trial.  Thus, more than two decades 
after Flowers entered death row, the Court reversed his conviction on the 
basis that the State’s exercise of a peremptory strike against a prospective 
African American juror was largely motivated in part by discriminatory 
intent.4  
 This Note will analyze the holding of Flowers and the current 
standard for adjudicating claims of racial discrimination in jury selection.  
Part II of this Note discusses the background and history of the law 
surrounding the peremptory strike.  Specifically, part II addresses the 
prevailing standard under Batson and the instant case.  Lastly, part III 
addresses an analysis of the instant case.  Particularly, part III addresses the 
ineffectiveness of Batson, as well as the majority’s shortcomings in 
assessing the facts of Flowers.  
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW 
 
A. Equal Protection and Batson v. Kennedy 
 
Ratified in 1868, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “no State shall 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”5  
Relying on this underlying principle, the primary purpose of the 
Amendment was to provide “freedom of the slave race, the security and 
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made 
freeman and citizen from the oppression of those who had formerly 
exercised unlimited dominion over him.”6  Thereafter, to help enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
making it a criminal offense for state officials to exclude persons from jury 
service on the basis of race.7  
During jury selection, each party is allowed a set number of 
peremptory challenges or strikes.8  Traditionally, peremptory strikes may 
be used to remove any potential juror for any reason and without any 
explanation.9  However, the traditional underpinnings of the peremptory 
strike contravened with the edicts of the Equal Protection Clause.10  As a 
 
    4. Id. at 2251.  
    5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
    6. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872). 
    7. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1948).   
    8. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238.  
    9. Id.  
  10. Id.  
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result, the Supreme Court faced the issue of applying equal protection 
principles to jury selection proceedings.11 
In Strauder v. West Virginia,12 12 years after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of 
racial discrimination in the jury selection process. There, a state statute 
permitted only Caucasians to serve as jurors, so the trial court summoned 
an all Caucasian venire to try an African American male accused of 
murder.13  In response, the defendant objected to the racial composition of 
the venire, alleging denial of a right afforded to Caucasian males to be tried 
before a jury consisting of the same race.14 
The Supreme Court invalidated the state statute as unconstitutional, 
explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state’s laws to apply 
equally to both African American and Caucasian individuals.15  
Specifically, the Court concluded that all persons, either African American 
or Caucasian, are equal before the laws of the states and discrimination on 
the basis of race is impermissible.16  To that end, the Court held that a denial 
of an African American to be tired before a jury consistent of his racial 
peers was a denial of the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.17   
 Echoing the decision in Strauder, the Court reiterated its holding in 
subsequent cases that states may not discriminate on the basis of race in the 
jury selection process.18  However, problems still persisted in guaranteeing 
equal protection because although laws excluding African Americans from 
jury service were unconstitutional after Strauder, many jurisdictions 
employed discriminatory tools to prevent African Americans from serving 
on a jury.19 
 One tool employed by many jurisdictions was the peremptory strike 
allowing a prosecutor to strike individuals for any reason.20  Through the 
exercise of the peremptory strike, racial exclusion became more concealed 
and less evident with strikes exercised in individual courtrooms rather than 
 
  11. Id. 
  12. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).   
  13. Id. at 304.  
  14. Id.  
  15. Id. at 307.  
  16. Id.  
  17. Id. 
  18. See e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880); Carter v. Texas, 177 
U.S. 442, 449 (1900); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938); Pierre v. Louisiana, 
306 U.S. 354, 362 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-32 (1940); Avery v. 
Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954); 
Coleman v, Alabama, 377 U.S. 129, 133 (1964).   
  19. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2240.   
  20. Id.  
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by comprehensive operation of law.21  While Strauder was a step toward 
equality by allowing African Americans to participate in the democratic 
process, jury selection remained entrenched with discriminatory intent 
through the employment of peremptory challenges.  Thus, 80 years after 
Strauder, the Court revisited the subject of racial discrimination in jury 
selection in Swain v. Alabama.22   
The defendant was an African American male convicted of a capital 
offense and sentenced to death.23  Prior to trial, the prosecutor struck all six 
qualified African American potential jurors to ensure a panel of all 
Caucasian jurors.24  Relying on the Strauder decision, the defendant argued 
that the prosecutor impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race by 
using peremptory challenges to strike all six African American potential 
jurors.25  
However, the Court held that the defendant failed to establish an 
unconstitutional violation of discrimination based on the state’s exercise of 
the six peremptory strikes.26  The Court explained that the striking of 
African Americans in a particular case was not a denial of equal protection, 
reasoning that prosecutors typically do not judge potential jurors 
individually in exercising peremptory strikes.27  But rather, prosecutors 
strike individual jurors based on limited knowledge afforded to them, which 
include affiliations of the racial group.28  Otherwise stated, “a prosecutor 
could permissibly strike an individual for any reason, including the 
assumption or belief that a[n] [African American] prospective juror, 
because of race, would be favorable to a[n] [African American] defendant 
or unfavorable to the State.”29  In doing this, the Court focused on the nature 
of the peremptory strike, allowing the strike to be exercised without inquiry 
and without the court’s intrusion or control.30  
Accordingly, under the Swain standard, for a defendant to 
successfully challenge a prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge, 
he or she had to prove that the state consistently and systematically 
discriminated on the basis of race in exercising its peremptory challenges.31  
 
  21. Id. 
  22. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).  
  23. Id. at 203.  
  24. Id.  
  25. Id.  
  26. Id. at 209.  
  27. Id.  
  28. Id.  
  29. Id. at 220.  
  30. Id.  
  31. Id. at 223. The Court stated that “in case after case, whatever the 
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, had 
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Upon proof of such pattern, the Court could infer that the state purposefully 
excluded African Americans from the right to serve on a jury, which 
constituted a denial of equal protection under law.32  However, this high 
standard of demonstrating a state’s historical and systematic exclusion 
posed an insurmountable burden on the defendant and essentially insulated 
prosecutors’ peremptory strikes from constitutional review.33 
In the seminal case of Batson v. Kentucky, 34 the Supreme Court 
revisited the severe burden of proof imposed by Swain to remedy the high 
bar for establishing a constitutional violation.  At the time of the Batson 
decision, African Americans continued their fight for fair and equal 
treatment post-civil rights movement.  Despite major legislative reform 
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,35 the Voting Rights Act of 1964,36 and 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968,37 racial discrimination still remained 
interwoven in the nation’s social and economic fabric.  The central focus of 
the Batson decision was to emphasize the Fourteenth Amendment’s goal of 
ending governmental discrimination on the basis of race.38  Consequently, 
delivering the majority opinion, Justice Powell effectively overturned the 
principles underlying the Swain decision and removed the obstacles for 
establishing a constitutional violation.39  
There, petitioner was an African American man indicted in 
Kentucky for second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods.40  The 
prosecution exercised all of its peremptory challenges to strike all four 
African American potential jurors and, thus the jury consisted of only 
Caucasian individuals.41  In response, defense counsel moved to discharge 
the jury on the basis that the prosecution’s removal of the African American 
veniremen violated the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
collected from a cross section of the community and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.42  Subsequently, the trial 
judge permitted the parties to exercise their peremptory challenges to strike 
anyone they wanted and denied petitioner’s motion, reasoning that the 
 
been responsible for the removal for the removal of qualified [African American] 
prospective jurors so that no [African American] jurors ever serve on petit juries.” Id.   
  32. Id. at 224. 
  33. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241.  
  34. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
  35. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1964).  
  36. Id.  
  37. FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 3602, et seq. (1964).  
  38. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241.  
  39. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82. 
  40. Id. at 82. 
  41. Id. at 83. 
  42. Id.  
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cross-section requirement applied only to the selection of venire and not to 
the selection of petit jury itself.43   
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner conceded 
that Swain foreclosed an equal protection claim based solely on the 
prosecutor’s conduct in his case but urged the court to follow the decisions 
of other jurisdictions to find a violation of his rights under the Sixth 
Amendment and the state constitution when the jury was not drawn from a 
cross section of the community.44  Petitioner also argued that the 
prosecution engaged in a “pattern” of discriminatory strikes in his case, 
thus, establishing an equal protection violation under Swain.45  However, in 
relying on Swain, the Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed with petitioner 
and affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that a defendant 
alleging lack of fair cross section had to demonstrate systematic exclusion 
of a group of jurors from the venire to establish a constitutional violation.46  
Upon examination by the Supreme Court, Justice Powell 
emphasized that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
elimination of governmental discrimination on the basis of race.47  Thus, 
the high bar for establishing a constitutional violation through proof that 
the state consistently and systematically employed discriminatory strikes 
was a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.48  As a 
result, the Batson decision effectively overruled Swain.49  
Under the prevailing standard articulated by Batson, if a defendant 
can demonstrate a prima facie case that the state’s peremptory strikes were 
motivated by racial discrimination, the state is then required to provide 
race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes.50  To assist courts in 
adjudicating claims of racial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory 
strike, Batson established a three-step process.51  First, the defendant has 
the burden of proving purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the 
contested peremptory strike.52  For a defendant to establish a prima facie 
case, he must first show that he is a member of a racial group susceptible to 
differential treatment, and that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory 
challenges to eliminate members of the defendant’s race from the venire.53  
 
  43. Id.  
  44. Id. 
  45. Id. at 83-4. 
  46. Id. at 84. 
  47. Id.  
  48. Id. at 85. 
  49. Id. at 95.  
  50. Id. at 96-7. 
  51. Id. at 94. 
  52. Id. at 93. 
  53. Id. at 94. 
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The defendant may also rely on the fact that the jury selection practice of a 
peremptory strike permits “those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
discriminate.”54  Lastly, the defendant may establish a prima facie case by 
showing that the totality of relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose.55  All relevant circumstances may include evidence 
of systematic exclusion of members of his race from jury service over an 
extended period of time, as well as evidence of the prosecutor’s questions 
and statements during voire dire.56  Importantly, the Court noted that the 
examples are merely illustrative and placed confidence in the trial judge’s 
to determine if circumstances creates a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination.57  
Second, once the defendant has established a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to offer a race-
neutral explanation for the challenged strike.58  In overcoming its burden, 
the prosecution’s explanation need not rise to the level of justifying a 
challenge for cause.59  Yet, the prosecution cannot offer general assertions 
that it had no discriminatory intent or that it challenged the jurors on the 
assumption (or intuition) that they would be partial to the defendant because 
of their shared race.60  But rather, the prosecution must articulate an 
explanation related to the case being tried.61  Lastly, upon the prosecution’s 
proffered race-neutral reason, the trial judge must determine whether the 
state’s reasons were legitimate or were a mere pretext for racial 
discrimination.62  Subsequent case law provides that a defendant may offer 
a variety of evidence to support a claim of a discriminatory strike by the 
prosecutor, including statistical evidence comparing strikes by the 
prosecutor against potential African American and Caucasian jurors, 
evidence of a prosecutor’s disparate questioning of potential jurors, side-
by-side comparison of potential African American jurors who were struck 
and potential Caucasian jurors who were not struck, a prosecutor’s 
misrepresentation of the record when offering a race-neutral explanation, 
relevant history of the state’s peremptory strikes in past cases, and other 
relevant circumstances related to the issue of racial discrimination.63  
 
  54. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 
  55. Id. at 96. 
  56. Id. at 96-7. 
  57. Id. at 97. 
  58. Id.  
  59. Id.  
  60. Id.  
  61. Id. at 98.  
  62. Id.  
  63. See Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016); Snyder v. 
Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).  
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Applying this newly founded standard to the facts of the case, the 
Court in Batson concluded that the petitioner made a timely objection to the 
prosecutor’s removal of all African American potential jurors from the petit 
jury.64  However, because the trial court rejected the objection without 
requiring the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for the 
peremptory strike, the Court remanded the case.65  Importantly, the Court 
noted that if the trial court determined that the petitioner established a prima 
facie of purposeful discrimination case based upon the facts and the 
prosecutor failed to present a race-neutral explanation, the petitioner’s 
conviction would have been reversed as consistent with the precedent 
established by the Court.66 
By enforcing the constitutional requirement that a criminal trial be 
free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process, Batson sought to 
eliminate the common practice of prosecutors excluding African American 
jurors in cases involving defendants of the same race. 67  The decision 
sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors and ensure public 
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. 68  In doing this, 
the Court has reiterated and reinforced the decision in Batson in subsequent 
cases and has extended the standard in various ways.69  For example, a 
defendant of any race may raise a Batson challenge even if the defendant 
and the juror are not of the same race.70  Further, Batson now applies to 
gender discrimination and to both criminal and civil cases.71  Overall, 
Batson sought to safeguard the constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
in the criminal cases for both defendants and jurors, and thus, a criminal 
defendant may challenge a state’s peremptory strike under the Equal 
Protection Clause.72  Notably, though, many scholars and commentators 
have highly criticized Batson for its failure to live up to its ideals, and many 
studies have shown that racial discrimination still remains in jury 
selection.73 
 
  64. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.  
  65. Id.  
  66. Id.  
  67. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2243.  
  68. Id.  
  69. Id.; see also Foster, 578 U.S. at  ___; Snyder, 552 U.S. at 472; Miller-El, 
545 U.S. at 231. 
  70. Id.; see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954).  
  71. Id.; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); 
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 
U.S. 614, 616 (1991).  
  72. Id. 
  73. See e.g. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Racial Discrimination and 
Jury Selection, 31 Crim. Just. 43 (2016); Ursula Noye, Blackstrikes: A Study of the 
Racially Disparate Use of Peremptory Challenges by the Caddo Parish District 
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B. Flowers v. Mississippi 
 
1. Facts and Procedural History of Flowers v. Mississippi  
 
Forty years later, in Flowers v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court 
revisited the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to peremptory strikes 
and the standard for determining a constitutional violation articulated by 
Batson.  The underlying events of the case occurred in Winona, Mississippi 
in July 1996 where four victims were murdered at Tardy Furniture.74  At 
the time of decision, petitioner, Curtis Flowers, was tried six separate times 
for the murder of the four employees.75  The same prosecutor, Doug Evans, 
represented the state of Mississippi in all six trials.76  
 In Flowers’ initial three trials, he was convicted of murder, but the 
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed each conviction.77  At Flowers’ first 
trial, the State exercised twelve peremptory strikes, five of which were used 
to strike all potential African American jurors.78  The trial court rejected 
Flowers’ Batson challenge and allowed the State to exercise all of its 
 
Attorney’s Office, REPRIEVE AUSTRALIA (Aug. 2015), https://perma.cc/KE3Q-KQAX; 
Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming 
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 
87 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1534 (2012); Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A 
Continuing Legacy, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Aug. 2010), https://eji.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf; Billy M. 
Turner, Rickie D. Lovell, John C. Young & William F. Denny, Race and Peremptory 
Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. 61, 63 
(1986); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender 
Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999); 
Richard Bourke & Joe Hingston, Black Strikes: A Study of the Racially Disparate Use of 
Peremptory Challenges by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s Office 5 (2003); 
David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A 
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 53 (2001); Paul H. Schwartz, 
Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kennedy 
in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1577 (1991); Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, 
Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a 
Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 65 (1988); Kenneth J. Melilli, 
Batson in Practice: What we Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 502-03 (1996); Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, 
Thirty Years of Disappointment: North Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1957, 1978 (2016); and Lorraine Morey, Keeping the Dragon Slayers in 
Check: Reining in Prosecutorial Misconduct, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 617, 621-26 (2012). 
  74. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2234.  
  75. Id. at 2234.  
  76. Id.  
  77. Id.  
  78. Id. at 2236.  
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peremptory strikes.79  Subsequently, Flowers was convicted.80  The 
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to prosecutorial 
misconduct.81  In the second trial, the State again exercised its peremptory 
strikes against all five potential African American jurors, but the trial court 
found that the State’s reason for one of the strikes was based on a pretext 
of discrimination.82  Because the trial court disallowed the strike, the court 
sat the sole African American juror and Flowers was convicted.83  
However, on appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.84  At the third trial, one 
of the African American jurors was struck for cause, leaving only sixteen.85  
Thereafter, the State exercised all of its fifteen peremptory strikes against 
fifteen of the potential African American jurors.86  Again, the trial court 
rejected Flowers’ Batson challenge and petitioner was convicted.87  Yet 
again, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction after finding 
that the State had violated Batson by discriminating on the basis of race in 
exercising all of its fifteen peremptory strikes.88  In reversing the 
conviction, the court concluded that the case presented a strong prima facie 
case of racial discrimination and that the State engaged in racially 
discriminatory practice during the jury selection process.89  
Flowers’ fourth and fifth trial ended in mistrials.90  In the fourth 
trial, the State used eleven out of eleven peremptory strikes against potential 
African American jurors.91  However, the jury was unable to reach a 
verdict.92  At Flowers’ fifth trial, there is no information available regarding 
the race of prospective jurors.93  At Flowers’ sixth trial, which the United 
States Supreme Court considered upon review of this instant case, there 
were twenty-six prospective jurors, six African American and twenty 
Caucasian.94  There, the State exercised six peremptory strikes, using five 
 
  79. Id.  
  80. Id.  
  81. Id. (citing Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 317 (Miss. 2000)).    
  82. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2236. 
  83. Id.  
  84. Id. at 2237 (citing Flowers v. State, 842 So. 2d 531, 538 (Miss. 2003)).  
  85. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2237. 
  86. Id.  
  87. Id.  
  88. Id. (citing Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss. 2007)). 
  89. Id.  
  90. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2237.  
  91. Id.  
  92. Id.  
  93. Id.  
  94. Id.  
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against African American prospective jurors.95  This left one African 
American juror to sit on the jury.96  Again, the trial court rejected Flowers’ 
Batson challenge, finding that the State presented race-neutral explanations 
for each of the five peremptory strikes exercised against the five African 
American jurors.97  Thus, the seated jury consisted of eleven Caucasian 
jurors and one African American juror.98  Ultimately, the jury convicted 
Flowers of murder and sentenced him to death.99 
Upon review, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the trial 
court’s decision regarding the Batson issue, concluding that the State’s 
proffered race-neutral reasons were valid and not merely pretextual.100  
Thereafter, Flowers sought review from the United States Supreme Court, 
in which the Court granted this writ of certiorari, remanding the proceeding 
for further consideration in view of the decision in Foster v. Chatman.101  
On remand, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld Flowers’ conviction in 
a 5-to-4 vote.102  Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review the matter.103  
 
2. Majority Opinion Delivered by Justice Kavanaugh  
 
 Recently appointed Supreme Court Justice, Brett Kavanaugh, 
delivered the majority opinion of Flowers v. Mississippi.  Remarkably, 
Justice Kavanaugh analyzed the landmark case of Batson v. Kentucky 104 in 
his law review note while attending Yale Law School in 1989. 105  
 The sole issue upon review was whether the Mississippi trial court 
clearly erred in concluding that the State was not motivated in substantial 
part by discriminatory intent when exercising its peremptory strikes at 
Flowers’ sixth trial.106  Justice Kavanaugh began his opinion with a 
historical overview of Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of racial 
discrimination in jury selection and the relevant case law leading up to the 
 
  95. Id.  
  96. Id.  
  97. Id.  
  98. Id.  
  99. Id.  
100. Id. (citing Flowers v. State, 158 So. 3d 1009, 1058 (Miss. 2014)).  
101. 578 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 195 L.E. 2d 1 (2016). 
102. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238 (citing Flowers v. State, 240 So. 3d 1082 
(Miss. 2017)). 
103. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2238.  
104. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
105. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Defense Presence and Participation: A Procedural 
Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187 (1989).  
106. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244.  
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Batson decision.107  Next, Justice Kavanaugh underscored three evidentiary 
and procedural issues raised by the Batson holding.108   
Throughout his discussion of Batson, Justice Kavanaugh revered the 
decision as immediately revolutionizing jury selection designed to eradicate 
racial discrimination.109  According to Justice Kavanaugh, Batson ended the 
widespread practice in which prosecutors routinely struck all African 
American potential jurors from cases involving defendants of the same 
race.110   
Turning next to the application of the case, Justice Kavanaugh 
addressed the extraordinary facts of Flowers’ case against the contextual 
framework established by Batson.111  In doing so, the majority assessed four 
evidentiary considerations of the instant case:   
 
(1) the history from Flowers’ six trials, (2) 
the prosecutor’s striking of five and six 
[African American] prospective jurors at the 
sixth trial, (3) the prosecutor’s dramatically 
disparate questioning of [African American] 
and [Caucasian] prospective jurors at the 
sixth trial, and (4) the prosecutor’s proffered 
reasons for striking [African American] juror 
(Carolyn White) while allowing other 
similarly situated [Caucasian] jurors to serve 
on the jury at the sixth trial.112 
 
 The first evidentiary consideration the majority addressed was the 
history from Flowers’ six trials.113  Justice Kavanaugh reiterated that a trial 
judge may consider the historical evidence of the State’s discriminatory 
peremptory strikes from prior trials in the jurisdiction to support a claim of 
racial discrimination.114  Thus, a defendant bringing a Batson claim may 
 
107. Id. at 2238-41. 
108. Id. at 2243.  
109. Id.  
110. Id.  
111. Id. at 2244.  
112. Id. Importantly, the majority noted that it only had to give great deference 
to the Mississippi trial court’s decision rather than the Mississippi Supreme Court’s 
findings because the case arose on direct review. Id.   
113. Id. at 2245.  
114. Id. Under the previous standard, the only way a defendant could make a 
claim that the State discriminated on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory 
strikes was for the defendant to establish a historical pattern of racial exclusion of jurors. 
Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. 
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gather and rely on all relevant evidence and circumstances to support his or 
her challenge.115  
 Justice Kavanaugh began his review of the history with an overview 
of the numbers from Flowers’ first four trials, noting that the State tried to 
strike thirty-six prospective African American jurors.116  This evidenced a 
pattern of excluding African American prospective jurors by the State, 
which, under Batson, may give rise to an inference of racial 
discrimination.117  Moreover, the majority noted that the Mississippi 
Supreme Court found on two occasions that the State impermissibly 
excluded African American prospective jurors in violation of Batson.118 
In addition to an overall review of the numbers demonstrating the 
State’s pattern of striking only African American jurors, Justice Kavanaugh 
summarized the most relevant history of Flowers’ trials beginning from 
petitioner’s first trial.119  Based on the historical overview of Flowers’ first 
four trials, the majority concluded that the State exercised its peremptory 
strikes to eliminate as many African American prospective jurors as 
possible.120  This systematic elimination suggested that the State sought to 
empanel an all Caucasian jury.121  Accordingly, the majority’s review of 
the history of Flowers’ first four trials strongly supported its conclusion that 
the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory strikes at Flowers’ sixth trial was 
substantially motivated in part by discriminatory intent.122  
The second evidentiary consideration the majority addressed was 
the prosecutor’s striking of five of the six African American prospective 
jurors at petitioner’s sixth trial.123  Again, a pattern of striking members of 
a particular race may give rise to an inference of racial discrimination.124 
During Flowers’ sixth trial, there were twenty-six prospective jurors 
with six who were African American.125  The State accepted one African 
 
115. Id. at 2245 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97). 
116. Id.  
117. Id.   
118. Id. For example, in Flowers’ second trial, the court found that the State 
discriminated against one African American juror evinced by the State’s false proffered 
reason that the stricken juror was inattentive and nodding off during questioning, and 
therefore the court sustained Flowers’ Batson challenge. Also, at Flowers’ third trial, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court held that the case presented a strong prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination on the basis of the State exercising all 15 peremptory strikes to 
eliminate all 15 African American jurors. Id.  
119. Id. at 2246.  
120. Id.  
121. Id.  
122. Id.  
123. Id.  
124. Id. 
125. Id.  
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American juror; however, it peremptorily struck the remaining five African 
American jurors.126  Thus, the seated jury at the sixth trial consisted of 
eleven Caucasian jurors and one African American juror.127  
  According to Justice Kavanaugh, the State’s exercise of 
peremptory strikes in petitioner’s sixth trial was similar to the first four 
trials.128  While the majority did acknowledge that the State in the sixth trial 
accepted one African American juror, such acceptance did not insulate the 
State from a Batson challenge given the history of the instant case.129  
Bolstering this observation, Justice Kavanaugh relied upon the finding in 
Miller-El v. Dretke130 that a State may accept one African American juror 
to obscure a pattern of consistently opposing African American jurors from 
being seated.131  Therefore, the majority concluded that the State 
peremptorily striking five of the six prospective African American jurors at 
the sixth trial supported the conclusion that the State was motivated in 
substantial party by discriminatory intent.132 
 Turning next to the third evidentiary consideration, Justice 
Kavanaugh addressed the disparate questioning of the African American 
and Caucasian prospective jurors during Flowers’ sixth trial.133  According 
to Batson, a prosecutor’s questions and statements during the jury selection 
process may support or rebut an inference of discriminatory intent.134  
 At Flowers’ sixth trial, the majority noted that the State asked the 
five struck African American jurors a total of 145 questions, in contrast to 
the total of 12 questions it asked to the 11 seated Caucasian jurors.135  
Statistically speaking, the State asked twenty-nine questions to each 
African American juror as opposed to one question it asked to each 
Caucasian juror.136  As the majority noted, this comparison of questions 
asked by the State necessarily inferred the finding that the State spent more 
time questioning the prospective African American jurors than the accepted 
Caucasian jurors.137  
 In response to the evidence of disparate questioning, which is 
probative of discriminatory intent, the State argued that it questioned the 
 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 2247.  
128. Id. 
129. Id.  
130. 545 U.S. 231, 250 (2005).  
131. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2247.  
132. Id.  
133. Id.  
134. Id.  
135. Id.  
136. Id.  
137. Id.  
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prospective African American and Caucasian jurors differently because of 
differences in the jurors’ characteristics.138  However, the Court rejected the 
argument, finding that the record reflected otherwise.139  While it is 
reasonable for the State to ask follow-up questions or to investigate 
relationships between the jurors and witnesses, the record reflected that the 
State did not question the prospective Caucasian jurors as extensively or 
investigated as thoroughly than the struck African American jurors, even 
though the jurors had substantial ties to the petitioner and the petitioner’s 
family.140  Importantly, although disparate questioning or investigation 
alone is not determinative of a Batson violation, such questioning, along 
with other evidence, may support an inference racial discrimination.141  
Consequently, the majority concluded that the dramatically disparate 
questioning of African American and Caucasian jurors at the petitioner’s 
sixth trial coupled with the historical evidence from the first four trials, 
supported its conclusion that the State was motivated in substantial part by 
a discriminatory intent at Flowers’ sixth trial.142   
 Finally, the majority reviewed the fourth evidentiary consideration 
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the State’s peremptory strike of 
prospective African American juror, Carolyn Wright, at Flowers’ sixth 
trial.143  
 As the majority recognized, comparing struck jurors and accepted 
jurors is a useful strategy in determining whether a Batson violation has 
occurred.144  Such comparison can insinuate that the State’s given reason 
for striking a juror was a pretext for discrimination.145  It is important to 
consider, though, that a defendant is not required to identify an identical 
Caucasian juror for the comparison to imply a discriminatory intent.146  
According to Miller-El v. Dretke,147 case law does not require that the 
individuals compared be identical in all respects because a rule providing 
 
138. Id.  
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 2248.  For example, Dianne Copper, an African American 
prospective juror, was asked 18 follow-up questions about her relationship with the 
Flowers’ and his family. In contrast, Pamela Chesteen, a Caucasian juror, was not asked 
nay follow-up questions notwithstanding the fact that Chesteen knew several members of 
Flowers’ family. Similarly, the State asked no follow-up questions of the other four 
Caucasian prospective jurors, even though they had relationships with the defense’s 
witnesses. Id.  
141. Id.  
142. Id.  
143. Id. at 2249.  
144. Id. at 2250.; see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483-84.  
145. Id.; see also Foster, 578 U.S. at ___.  
146. Id.; see also Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 247. 
147. 545 U.S. 231, 247, n. 6 (2005). 
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that a “defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly 
identical [Caucasian] juror would leave Batson inoperable.”148  
 The majority noted that while Wright was a proponent for the death 
penalty and had a family member that was a prison guard, the State’s 
proffered reason for the contested strike was due to her relationship with 
several defense witnesses and her employment at the Wal-Mart where 
Flowers’ father also worked.149  Yet, Justice Kavanaugh identified three 
other prospective Caucasian jurors was also knew many individuals 
involved in the case;150 nonetheless, the jurors were not asked individual 
follow-up questions, unlike Wright.151  Moreover, even though the record 
reflected that Wright had worked at the local Wal-Mart with Flowers’ 
father, there was no evidence that they worked closely together or even 
knew each other.152  This side-by-side comparison of the struck African 
American to the similarly situated Caucasian jurors suggested a 
discriminatory intent by the State.153  
 In addition, the State also explained that it struck Wright for her 
prior litigation with Tardy Furniture thirteen years earlier.154 However, the 
majority rejected this reason, explaining that the State failed to explain how 
Wright’s prior lawsuit would affect her ability to impartially serve as a juror 
at the sixth trial.155  Further, the State also explained that it struck Wright 
because she worked with one of Flowers’ sisters.156  However, again, the 
majority rejected this explanation, finding that the State made an incorrect 
statement about the record, which is indicative of discriminatory intent.157  
Justice Kavanaugh identified three other occasions where the State 
misstated the record to justify the striking of African American prospective 
jurors.158  
 
148. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2249.  
149. Id.  
150. Id. Chesteen, a Caucasian juror, had provided services to the Flowers 
family at the local bank and knew several of the Flowers’ family members. Similarly, 
Bobby Lester, another Caucasian juror, also worked at the bank and knew several family 
members of the defendant.   
151. Id. at 2250. 
152. Id.  
153. Id.  
154. Id.  
155. Id.  
156. Id.  
157. Id.  
158. Id. The majority noted that the State made incorrect statements in regard to 
three prospective African American jurors Tashia Cunningham, Edith Burnside, and 
Flancie Jones. The State asserted that Cunningham and Flowers’ sister were close 
friends; however, the parties only had a working relationship. Likewise, the State 
claimed that Burnside had tried to hide a lawsuit involving Tardy Furniture, but she had 
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In noting that the side-by-side comparison of Wright to accepted 
Caucasian jurors should not be considered in isolation, the majority 
examined the strike in the context of all the facts and circumstances as 
consistent with prior precedent.159  In light of the history of the State’s 
exercise of peremptory strikes, the State’s striking of five of the six African 
American prospective jurors at Flowers’ sixth trial, and the State’s 
dramatically disparate questioning of jurors during the sixth trial suggested 
that the State was motivated in part by discriminatory intent.160 
Overall, Justice Kavanaugh reversed and remanded the case on the 
basis that all the facts and circumstances of the four factors considered as a 
whole established that the trial court at Flowers’ sixth trial committed clear 
error in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of Wright was not 
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.161  Notably, Justice 
Kavanaugh stated that the Court need not decide  that any one of the four 
factors alone would require reversal, and emphasized that the decision 
broke no new legal ground.162   
 
3. Concurring Opinion by Justice Alito  
 
Justice Alito delivered a brief concurring opinion.  In his 
concurrence, Justice Alito explained that there would have been little 
difficulty in affirming Flowers’ conviction given the State’s facially 
legitimate reasons for its peremptory strikes.163  However, because of the 
many connections a high percentage of the potential jurors had to either 
Flowers or the victims and the fact that the case was tried by the same 
prosecutor in all six trials, the jury selection process was not able to be 
assessed as it would have been in a typical proceeding. 164  These 
connections, as Justice Alito acknowledged, complicated the trial judge’s 
ability to determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered reasons was mere 
pretext of racial discrimination or legitimate intentions.165  Accordingly, 
Justice Alito, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, concurred with 
the Court’s reversal of Flowers’ conviction and remand of the case for 
further proceedings.166    
 
not. And, lastly, the State alleged that Jones was Flowers’ aunt; however, that was 
untrue. Id.  
159. Id. at 2251.  
160. Id.  
161. Id.  
162. Id.  
163. Id. at 2252.  
164. Id.  
165. Id.  
166. Id.  
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4. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas  
 
 Justice Thomas delivered the dissenting opinion of Flowers v. 
Mississippi with whom Justice Gorsuch joined Parts I, II, and III of the 
opinion.167  In his contemptuous opinion, Justice Thomas began his lengthy 
dissent by admonishing the Court for incorrectly granting review of the 
case.168  He chided the majority for reframing the issue of the case, so it 
could review the factual findings of the state courts without resolving the 
actual legal question.169  Justice Thomas further speculated that the Court 
granted certiorari because of the media attention surrounding the case.170  
Consequently, Justice Thomas contended that the grant of review wasted 
the State’s, defendant’s, and lower court’s resources by not reviewing the 
state court’s application of Batson the first time.171   
 The second part of the dissent’s argument focused on the merits of 
the case, concluding that no evidence presented purposeful race 
discrimination by the State in jury selection at Flowers’ sixth trial.172  
Specifically, Justice Thomas argued that each of the five strikes at the sixth 
trial were justified by the State’s proffered race-neutral grounds, that none 
of the struck African American jurors were remotely similar to the seated 
Caucasian jurors, and that the trivial mistakes of fact or disparate 
questioning on part of the State provided no evidence of purposeful racial 
discrimination.173 
 Because there was no evidence of racial discrimination, the dissent 
contended, in part three, that the majority’s decision hinged only upon 
conduct that occurred before the instant case.174  Particularly, Justice 
Kavanaugh’s reliance upon the narrative that the instant case had a long 
history of racial discrimination to support its finding of a clear error on part 
of the trial court was improper and had no basis in the record.175  According 
to Justice Thomas, Flowers’ was unable to overcome his burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and thus, the 
trial court did not clearly err in its holding.176 
In the finale of Justice Thomas’ laborious dissent, with whom 
Justice Gorsuch declined to join, part four focused on the constitutional 
 
167. Id. at 2253.  
168. Id.  
169. Id. at 2254.  
170. Id.  
171. Id. at 2255.  
172. Id.  
173. Id.  
174. Id. at 2267. 
175. Id.  
176. Id.  
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implications of Batson.177  According to Justice Thomas, Batson has led the 
Court to disregard the limitations set forth by Article III on standing by 
allowing a convicted criminal, who has suffered no injury, additional 
opportunities.178  In the present case, the dissent noted that Flowers suffered 
no legally cognizable harm because he was not the juror excluded on the 
basis of race.179  Flowers also failed to assert his right to an impartial jury.180  
Therefore, although the majority held that Wright’s denial from jury service 
was a denial of equal protection, she was not the individual challenging 
Flowers’ convictions, and, thereby Flowers’ lacked standing to assert her 
claim.181 
Additionally, Justice Thomas vehemently opposed Batson itself.182  
Unlike Justice Kavanaugh who famed Batson as revolutionizing the jury 
selection process,183 Justice Thomas contended that the decision imposed 
equal protection principles upon a procedure designed to give parties 
absolute discretion in exercising their peremptory strikes.184  Since the 
decades following Batson, the dissent characterized the cases as a 
“misguided effort to remedy societal wrong by using the Constitution to 
regulate the traditionally discretionary exercise of peremptory 
challenges.185  Batson “emphasiz[es] the rights of excluded jurors at the 
expense of the traditional protection according criminal defendants of all 
races,”186 rather than to help ensure fairness of criminal proceedings.187  
Therefore, Justice Thomas urged the Court to return to the days before 
Batson where race mattered in a courtroom to allow litigants utilization of 
an important tool to prevent prejudice in their case.188  
 
177. Id. at 2270.  
178. Id.  
179. Id.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 89; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400, 414 (1991); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) 
(explaining that to have standing to bring an equal protection claim in a separate suit, 
“the juror would have to show that the State’s action caused him to suffer an injury in 
fact, and a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress the injury.”) 
180. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
181. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2270. While a defendant could conceivably suffer an 
injury under a Batson violation if the court believes that he would receive a more 
favorable outcome if more members of his race are on the jury, this opportunity 
contravenes with the rejected assumption that jurors might be partial to the defendant 
because of their shared race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 
182. Id. at 2271. 
183. Id. at 2243. 
184. Id. at 2271. 
185. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 404 n.1 (1998) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
186. Id.   
187. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2243.  
188. Id.  
346 MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 39:2 
 In support of his argument that the Court should abandon the Batson 
framework, Justice Thomas reviewed the evolving jurisprudence of the 
peremptory strike.189  Batson’s reliance on equal protection ignored the 
nature of the peremptory strike and the realities of racial prejudice.190  
Because “the [peremptory] strike is exercised based on intuition that a 
potential juror may be less sympathetic to a party’s case,” a strike “reflect[s] 
no judgment on a juror’s competence, ability or fitness.”191  Thus, a juror is 
challenged on the basis of the limited knowledge afforded to counsel, which 
may include the juror’s group affiliations.192 
 Moreover, Justice Thomas criticized Batson for focusing solely on 
individual rights of jurors instead of the traditional underpinnings of the 
peremptory challenge.193  Historically, the peremptory strike protected 
against impartiality and effectuated a party’s intuitions about a juror’s 
unstated biases.194  By requiring an explanation for the strike, as demanded 
by equal protection guarantee, the requirement contravenes with the very 
nature of the practice.195 The strike must be exercised with full freedom or 
its purpose fails.196  Also, the dissent argued that the application of an equal 
protection analysis to the peremptory strike has distorted the nation’s 
jurisprudence since the Court did not apply equal protection ideologies to 
peremptory strikes until more than 100 years after the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified.197  Thus, in closing, Justice Thomas opposed 
Batson for leading the way to eliminate peremptory strikes by requiring an 
explanation for individual strikes as inconsistent with the practice’s 




A. Batson: An Ineffective Tool 
 
 The overall objective of Batson and its progeny was to instill public 
respect and to ensure confidence in the criminal justice system to safeguard 
 
189. Id. at 2272-73.  
190. Id. at 2273.  
191. Id.  
192. Id.; see Swain, 380 U.S. at 221.  
193. Id. at 2273.  
194. Id.  
195. Id.  
196. Id. at 2274; see Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).  
197. Id. at 2274.   
198. Id. Justice Thomas explained that the realities of racial biases, sympathies, 
and prejudices are part of the racial composition of a jury that should not be rendered 
obsolete. Such thinking would prevent African American defendants from striking 
potentially hostile Caucasian jurors, and thus, hindering a fair trial.  
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the fundamental right that no citizens shall be disqualified from jury service 
on the basis of race.199  Yet, evidence suggests that Batson is not the 
effective mechanism the Supreme Court hoped it to be.  
Throughout Justice Kavanaugh’s majority opinion of Flowers v. 
Mississippi, he praised the Batson decision for revolutionizing the jury 
selection process by providing a mechanism to eliminate discrimination, 
and for immediately eliminating the widespread practice of prosecutors 
routinely striking African American jurors in cases involving defendants of 
the same race.200  In sharp contrast, Justice Thomas in his dissent repeatedly 
criticized Batson as a misguided effort to remedy a societal wrong by 
imposing constitutional limitations on a “traditionally discretionary 
exercise of peremptory challenges.”201  In other words, the majority 
overstated the effectiveness of Batson, while the dissent disagreed with the 
method of such reform to ensure equal protection rights.  
 
1. Studies of racial discrimination in jury selection 
 
Evidence suggests that substantial disparities still remain.202  Batson 
has failed to enforce the mandate of equal protection and administration of 
justice, nor has it ensured the community’s interest in a fair and impartial 
criminal justice system.  For example, in a recent study, the Caddo Parish 
District Attorney’s office in Louisiana collected data from 332 felony jury 
trials from 2003 to 2012. 203  By examining the rate at which prosecutors 
exercised their peremptory strikes against the race of the stricken or 
accepted jurors, the data revealed that when presented with a prospective 
African American juror, prosecutors peremptorily struck that African 
American juror 46% of the time.204  In contrast, when presented with a 
Caucasian juror, the prosecutors struck that juror only 15% of the time.205  
Consequently, based on the data, prosecutors were more than three times as 
likely to strike African American prospective jurors than others.206  
 Similarly, law students from the University of Iowa studied the 
exercise of peremptory strikes by prosecutors in capital trials of defendants 
 
199. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986). 
200. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2241. 
201. Id. at 2270.  
202. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Racial Discrimination and Jury 
Selection, 31 CRIM. JUST. 43 (2016). 
203. Ursula Noye, Blackstrikes: A Study of the Racially Disparate Use of 
Peremptory Challenges by the Caddo Parish District Attorney’s Office, REPRIEVE 
AUSTRALIA (Aug. 2015), https://perma.cc/KE3Q-KQAX. 
204. Id.  
205. Id.  
206. Id.  
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on death row in North Carolina as of 2010.207  Over a twenty-year period, 
the data revealed that prosecutors struck prospective African American 
jurors at about 2.5 times the rate that they struck prospective jurors of a 
different race.208  The article also examined studies analyzing appellate 
decisions reviewing Batson claims, and concluded that Batson has been 
unsuccessful in expelling race from the jury selection process.209 
Moreover, a 2010 report conducted by the Equal Justice Initiative 
focused on jury selection procedures in eight southern states, including 
Mississippi, finding evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection in 
every state.210  The report uncovered that prosecutors excluded nearly 80% 
of African Americans qualified for jury service.211  Of the counties 
composed of a majority of African American residents, capital defendants 
were tried by all Caucasian juries.212  Further, the report noted that 
challenges for underrepresentation in the jury pool is impossible in more 
than 90% of counties for Latinos and Asian Americans.213  Further studies 
have revealed the same.214  Overall, evidence indicates substantial 
disparities in race in jury selection, thus suggesting that racial 
discrimination remains deeply entrenched in jury selection. 
 
207. Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The 
Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina 
Capital Trials, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1534 (2012).  
208. Id.  
209. Id. at 1541.   
210. Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, 
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Aug. 2010), at 4, https://eji.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf. 
211. Id.  
212. Id.  
213. Id. at 36.  
214. See e.g. Billy M. Turner, Rickie D. Lovell, John C. Young & William F. 
Denny, Race and Peremptory Challenges During Voir Dire: Do Prosecution and 
Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. 61, 63 (1986) (finding that 44% of prospective African 
American jurors were struck, even though the percentage of the population in the 
Louisiana parish that were African American was 18%); Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory 
Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999) (finding that prosecutors used 60% of their strikes 
against African American jurors, who constituted 32% of the venire, while defense 
attorneys used 87% of their strikes against Caucasian jurors, who constituted 68% of the 
venire); Richard Bourke & Joe Hingston, Black Strikes: A Study of the Racially 
Disparate Use of Peremptory Challenges by the Jefferson Parish District Attorney’s 
Office 5 (2003) (finding that in juries consisting of six or twelve jurors, prosecutors 
struck prospective African American jurors at more than three times the rate they struck 
Caucasian jurors); David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital 
Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 53 (2001) 
(finding that prosecutors struck on average 51% of African Americans jurors compared 
to only 26% of jurors of a different race).  
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2. Reasons for Batson’s ineffectiveness 
 
One possible reason for Batson’s ineffectiveness at expelling racial 
discrimination is that the decision failed to address that a peremptory strike 
may be still be exercised irrationally and illegitimately, so long as the basis 
for the strike was not race.  In other words, under Batson, as long as the 
reason for the strike is found to be race-neutral, the prosecution may 
continue to strike prospective jurors for any reason.  For example, in the 
same report conducted by the Equal Justice Initiative in 2010, the results 
revealed that in many of the cases reviewed, the race neutral explanations 
for exclusion were based on pretextual reasons intended to conceal racial 
biases, including exclusion based on low intelligence, wore eyeglasses, 
were single, married, or separated, or were too old for jury service.215  The 
African American prospective jurors were also excluded for having 
relatives who attended historically African American colleges, for the way 
they walk, for chewing gum, and for frequently living in predominately 
African American neighborhoods.216  Thus, as long as the proffered reason 
is race neutral, the trial court may accept the reason as permissible, even 
though the strike was based on illegitimate explanations.  
Another possible reason for Batson’s ineffectiveness is the trial 
courts’ reluctance to find a Batson violation and the appellate courts 
deferential standard in reviewing Batson challenges.  A prosecutor need 
only offer a race neutral explanation to overcome the second hurdle of a 
Batson analysis.  Typically, this burden is easy to overcome because trial 
courts accept the reason as permissible instead extending the inquiry to 
assess the credibility of the prosecutor.217  Moreover, appellate courts 
employ a deferential standard of review for Batson challenges because 
appellate courts only review the record, while trial courts are able to view 
the demeanor of the jurors and attorneys in the court room.218  As Justice 
Kavanaugh noted in his opinion of Flowers, appellate standard of review 
of a trial court’s factual findings is highly deferential.219   
Lastly, another possible reason for Batson’s ineffectiveness is the 
ease in which prosecutors can meet their burden to offer a race-neutral 
explanation for the challenged strike.  
As previously stated, the burden of establishing a race neutral explanation 
is not difficult.  The prosecutors’ race-neutral reason need not be persuasive 
 
215. Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, 
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Aug. 2010), at 36, https://eji.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf. 
216. Id. at 4.  
217. Nancy C. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1593 (2012).  
218. Id.; see Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1568-71.  
219. Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244.  
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or plausible.220  A prosecutor’s race neutral reasons to rebut an inference of 
discrimination falls within two categories: Objectively verifiable reasons 
that lead to challenges for cause based on bias or other grounds, and 
primarily subjective reasons which lead to challenges based on inarticulable 
gut feelings.221  Valid explanations that fall within the first category include 
a juror who has a close relative to the defendant, a juror who was previously 
represented by defense counsel, a juror about the same age as defendant, a 
juror who had past legal problems with the government, and a juror who 
was young, single, unemployed, or poor.222  Valid reasons falling within 
the second category include a juror with a poor attitude, a juror who 
appeared disinterested, unintelligent, or bewildered, a juror who seemed 
hostile to the prosecutor, a juror who was unable to get along with other 
jurors, and a juror who was anti-law enforcement from previous 
experiences.223  Based on these valid explanations, prosecutors are able to 
disguise their racial discrimination with race neutral explanations to 
overcome their burden.  
One study reviewed cases from 1986 through 1993 to examine the 
success rate of prosecutors in offering a race neutral explanation.224  The 
results suggested that while it was relatively easy for a defendant to 
establish a prima facie case, it was difficult to prevail on a Batson challenge 
overall.225  A possible reason for this was the ease in which the responding 
party was able to offer a neutral explanation.226  Further results uncovered 
that criminal defense attorneys were disproportionately unsuccessful at 
offering neutral explanations, while in contrast, prosecutors enjoyed a 
higher success rate at rebutting prima facie cases with neutral 
explanations.227  The study further examined the success rate of providing 
neutral explanations by targeted groups.228  The overall results indicated 
that Batson respondents offered valid neutral explanations in almost four 
out of five situations.229  Notably, the results indicated that in cases of 
reverse Batson challenges against Caucasian jurors, prosecutors had more 
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224. Melilli, supra note 73, at 460. 
225. Id. at 460-61.  
226. Id.  
227. Id. at 461.  
228. Id. at 462-65. 
229. Id. at 465. 
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success than defense attorneys challenging prosecutors’ strikes.230  Thus, 
even if a defendant establishes a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination at the first step, the burden imposed on the prosecutor to 
present a race-neutral explanation for the strike is easy to overcome, and it 
remains difficult to prevail on a Batson challenge.231  
 
3. Solutions for Batson  
 
The Batson decision was the focal point surrounding the majority’s 
ruling in Flowers v. Mississippi where, upon review, the sole question was 
whether the Mississippi Supreme Court’s ruling concerning the State’s past 
use of peremptory strikes in Flowers’ case was proper within the scope of 
the Batson challenge.  However, because evidence suggests that racial 
discrimination still remains entrenched in the jury selection process, this 
provokes the question of whether Batson is the proper standard to determine 
if racial discrimination did indeed exist at the time of the exercise of a 
peremptory challenge.  As many scholars have regarded Batson as a failure 
for its inability to eliminate discriminatory use of the peremptory strike, this 
suggests that the Mississippi Supreme Court was improperly guided as to 
its conclusion that no Batson violation had occurred, and thus, review by 
the Supreme Court was unnecessary if the standard had been appropriate. 
Based on the standard under Batson, once the defendant meets his 
or her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
burden shifts to the prosecution to offer a race neutral explanation for the 
challenged strike.  As scholars and studies have uncovered, this is an 
exceptionally low burden to overcome because a prosecutor’s reason need 
not be plausible or persuasive, so long as the prosecutor does not rebut the 
defendant’s prima facie case by stating merely that he challenged the juror 
on the assumption that the juror would be partial to the defendant because 
of their shared race or by merely denying that he had a discriminatory 
motive or by affirming his good faith belief in the individual selection.232  
This allows prosecutors to exclude African American jurors for any reason 
by providing a list of explanations for striking a particular juror that are 
essentially a substitute for exclusion on the basis of race.   
To ensure that racial discrimination does not infiltrate the jury 
selection process, a more stringent standard should be established to 
safeguard against racial discrimination.  For example, a higher burden of 
 
230. Id. at 462-65 (explaining that Batson respondents were less successful in 
providing valid explanations for challenges based on gender or against Caucasian jurors, 
as compared to challenges against African Americans or Hispanics).  
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proof should be required for a prosecutor to overcome the burden of 
offering a race neutral explanation.  Even though the Batson court stated 
that the race neutral explanation need not rise to the level justifying a 
challenge for cause,233 a similarly high standard should be employed for 
evaluating a prosecutor’s race neutral reason.  As studies have shown, the 
prosecution may easily overcome their burden at the second step because 
of the thinly veiled justifications accepted by the court, even though the 
reasons are actually exercised based on discriminatory intent.  If a higher 
burden of proof is required, then this may reduce the likelihood that the 
prosecution is able to eliminate potential African American jurors on the 
basis of discrimination because the prosecution may not rest on its laurels 
and will be required to offer an actual valid reason for the strike.  
Moreover, Justice Thomas noted in his dissent of the instant case 
that race based peremptory strikes are not reviewed under the strict scrutiny 
standard.234  As the Supreme Court has consistently held, laws that infringe 
upon a fundamental right or involve a race-based classification are subject 
to the strict scrutiny standard pursuant to the Court’s equal protection and 
due process jurisprudence.235  Yet, even though a Batson challenge is based 
on an argument of racial discrimination, it remains the glaring exception to 
the strict scrutiny standard.  The current standard only requires a barely 
plausible explanation for the proffered race-neutral explanation.  This begs 
the question of why a Batson challenge is exempted from the strict scrutiny 
review while the Court has historically applied the highest standard for laws 
that infringe upon a fundamental right or involves a suspect classification, 
such as race.  If the Court were to apply a strict scrutiny standard in 
reviewing the constitutionality of the government’s discrimination, as it 
does for other race-based classifications, this may reduce the likelihood of 
discrimination in jury selection because the government’s proffered race-
neutral explanation would have to pass high constitutional muster.  
Accordingly, the core of equal justice demands a higher standard for both 
reviewing a race-based peremptory challenge and overcoming the burden 
of offering a race-neutral explanation to ensure that discrimination does 
persist and that the Equal Protection Clause does not become illusory and 
futile.  
In addition to a higher burden of proof at the second step and 
applying the strict scrutiny standard for reviewing race-based peremptory 
challenge, a trial court should diligently and strictly analyze a prosecutor’s 
exercise of a peremptory challenge when there is a history of racial 
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discrimination or even a hint of it.  As the majority stated in Batson, “one 
racially discriminatory peremptory strike is one too many,” and as Chief 
Justice Roberts mentioned at oral argument of the instant case, a 
prosecutor’s Batson violation is pertinent to the assessment of a current 
Batson challenge.236  If the prosecution cannot offer a valid race-neutral 
explanation coupled with a history of racial discrimination, a prosecutor 
should not have the privilege of utilizing peremptory challenges to his or 
her advantage.  This may deter the misconduct if peremptory strikes are not 
made available because a prosecutor may be more careful in striking 
potential jurors.  Just as criminal defendants are incarcerated or fined if 
found guilty, prosecutors should be penalized for their misconduct.    
Lastly, a solution to the ineffectiveness of Batson may be to film the 
hearings so appellate courts are able to watch the jury selection and see 
what the trial judge views.  According to prior studies, appellate courts are 
highly deferential to a trial court’s findings because the trial court is able to 
gauge the demeanor and mannerisms of the prospective jurors.  A recording 
of the Batson hearing may eliminate the need for the highly deferential 
standard of review because appellate courts are able to view the factual 
findings presented at trial and may not rely solely on the findings of trial 
courts.  Moreover, the benefits to filming the hearings would outweigh the 
administrative burdens, if any, because filming may be operated by the 
court personnel in the ordinary course of the court’s business and allow 
reviewing courts complete visualization of the proceedings.  Filming the 
proceedings may also provide efficiency and modernization to the 
courtroom because it can be used to record jury selection so that an 
immediate record is available for use in preparation of appeal and review 
by the appellate court.237  Accordingly, by filming Batson hearings, an 
appellate court may have the privilege of viewing the proceedings for itself 
and not have to rely wholly on findings of the trial courts in determining 
whether a prosecutor discriminated in striking a potential juror.   
 
B. Legitimizing an Ineffective Tool 
 
 Flowers v. Mississippi represents the Supreme Court’s recent 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to a criminal procedure issue.  
Throughout the majority opinion, Justice Kavanaugh repeatedly stressed 
that equal justice requires that a criminal trial be free from racial 
discrimination in jury selection and that discriminatory jury selection 
 
236. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18:22-25, 19:1, Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 
S. Ct. 2228 (2019) (No. 17-9572). 
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violates the Fourteenth Amendment.238  Yet, the majority opinion failed to 
further or strengthen Batson.  
To answer the sole question on review, the Court analyzed four 
evidentiary categories it deemed relevant.239  However, the majority limited 
its application to these four factors, which focused only on the pattern of 
racial discrimination by the State in Flowers’ particular case.  Although the 
Batson court discussed that a court may consider the long and unexplained 
exclusion of members from the defendant’s particular race in other jury 
panels,240 the majority failed to acknowledge or discuss the exclusion of 
other prospective African American jurors by the State in other cases.  
Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh refused to indicate how he weighed the four 
evidentiary factors leading to the Court’s decision, stating that “we need 
not and do not decide that any of [these] four factors along would require 
reversal.”241  Instead, Justice Kavanaugh emphasized that the extent of 
racial discrimination in the instant case was due solely to the State’s 
misconduct, which gave rise to a constitutional violation.   
The majority should have expanded its analysis to include instances 
of blatant discrimination by the State in prior proceedings to further bolster 
its conclusion of the State’s felonious intent.  Future defendants alleging 
claims of discrimination by the State may not be comforted by the 
majority’s decision because lower courts may limit its application to only 
the facts of the particular proceeding, which may, in turn, impair a 
defendant’s claim of discrimination.  Moreover, Justice Kavanaugh should 
have also indicated the weight he gave to each of the four factors to help 
lower courts in assessing Batson challenges.  In refusing to indicate how it 
weighed the four evidentiary factors, future defendants and courts may not 
know the point at which the facts demonstrate discrimination, which will 
allow courts to apply their own standards for assessing Batson claims.  
Although a bright-line rule for weighing evidentiary considerations may 
impose restrictions, some guidance by the Court would have been helpful 
for future defendants and courts to accurately assess a claim of 
discrimination by the State.  Thus, by limiting the application of Batson to 
the facts of the instant case and refusing to give weight to any of the four 
factors, the majority did nothing to clarify or strengthen Batson.   
Further, as Justice Kavanaugh stated, the decision broke no new 
legal ground. 242  The opinion merely reaffirmed the current legal standard 
as legitimate, even though Batson has been heavily criticized for its lack of 
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effectiveness.  The majority only remedied the misconduct of one 
prosecutor without fixing the entire system that has consistently allowed 
the government to continue its discriminatory practice without 
consequence.  Consequently, aware of the persistent problems of 
discrimination that have plagued jury selection, Justice Kavanaugh took no 
steps to solve the inadequate and “toothless”243 tool designed to prevent 
discriminatory strikes.    
 
C. The Unresolved Issue of a Wayward Prosecutor 
 
In reaching his decision, Justice Kavanaugh focused solely on the 
four evidentiary issues the Court deemed relevant in determining whether 
the prosecutor for the State, Doug Evans, violated Flowers’ constitutional 
right by excluding a prospective African American juror from the sixth trial. 
244  Yet, the majority failed to directly address the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct, even though the sole issue concerned the prosecutor’s unlawful 
exercise of the contested strike.  Prosecutorial misconduct undermines the 
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial and legitimate judgments, as well as 
hinders public confidence in the criminal justice system.245  By failing to 
address the prosecutor’s determination to empanel an all Caucasian jury, 
the majority allowed Evans to slip through the cracks of the justice system 
and permitted him to continue his discriminatory practice.  
First, the Court’s failure to address the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct inadvertently allows guilty prosecutors to avoid penalties for 
their constitutional violations by failing to provide remedies to ensure that 
prosecutors do not violate the law again.  Prosecutors are endowed with 
much power in the criminal justice system, and as such, judicial and 
legislative safeguards are provided to ensure that they perform their duties 
in accordance with established professional and ethical standards.  
However, the current remedies for prosecutorial misconduct are largely 
ineffective because of their inadequacy at disciplining offending 
prosecutors.  For example, in the rare event that an appellate court reverses 
a defendant’s conviction for prosecutorial misconduct, the judicial opinion 
fails to name the offending prosecutor. 246 Consequently, the majority did 
nothing to protect future defendants from being tried by wrongdoing 
prosecutors and contributed to the overall ineffectiveness of deterring such 
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misconduct by allowing offending prosecutors to continue their practices at 
the detriment of the people.  
 Second, by failing to provide an answer to the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct in the present case, the majority allowed Evans to continue his 
discriminatory practices without consequence.  The issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct was not novel concept to the present case.  In two instances 
from the prior proceedings, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed 
Flowers’ conviction for prosecutorial misconduct, and even found the State 
to be engaged in discrimination against African American prospective 
jurors.247  Despite the Mississippi Supreme Court finding proof of 
prosecutorial misconduct on numerous occasions, Evans still remained the 
lead prosecutor on the case throughout Flowers’ six trials.248   
Notably, at oral argument of the present case, Justice Alito and 
Sotomayor questioned the State as to why a single prosecutor was allowed 
to try a case six times, instead of allowing the State Attorney General to 
step in and try the case in a different county where the potential jurors 
would not have had as many connections to the defendant.249  In response, 
the State explained that Mississippi statutory law only allows the Attorney 
General to assist upon request by the district attorney, and Doug Evans, the 
prosecutor in the instant case, declined to do so.250 However, if the issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct had been addressed by the courts from the 
beginning, the instant case may not have required a finding of purposeful 
discrimination and would have provided a remedy to hold guilty 
prosecutors accountable for their constitutional violations.  
Even if the Court had addressed the issue and reversed Flowers’ 
conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct, Evans’ may still continue 
his discriminatory practices because such solutions have shown to be 
ineffective.  For example, Mississippians may exercise their democratic 
power to elect a different district attorney and halt the misconduct adversely 
affecting the county.  However, this solution appears to be ineffective 
because Evans ran unopposed in 2019, and thus allowed him to continue 
his usage of racial discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory 
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challenge.251  Importantly, though, Evans has recused himself from the 
Flowers case and asked the Circuit Judge to appoint the Mississippi 
attorney general’s office to the proceeding.252  
Further, professional sanctions are ineffective at deterring 
prosecutorial misconduct because in Mississippi, a lawyer who has engaged 
in racial discrimination in jury selection is not likely to face any form of 
professional discipline.253  Private actions appear to be ineffective as well 
at resolving the issue of prosecutorial misconduct.  Recently, a class action 
lawsuit has been filed against Evans for his alleged violation of 
constitutionally rights by excluding African Americans from serving on 
juries.254  However, the Supreme Court established “absolute immunity” 
for prosecutors in suits involving monetary damages for unlawful conduct 
in court.255  Accordingly, in the absence of court intervention and effective 
remedies for prosecutorial misconduct, prosecutors may overlook the 
decision of the Court and continue their racial discriminatory practices in 




  The extraordinary facts of Flowers v. Mississippi provided another 
chance for the Supreme Court to rectify the persistent problem of racial 
discrimination in jury selection and remedy the highly criticized tool 
ostensibly designed to thwart against discriminatory strikes.  Instead, the 
Court simply reinforced the standard under Batson despite widespread 
criticism of its failure to live up to its ideals of eradicating invidious 
discrimination.  Further, although the Court correctly held that the State 
violated Flowers’ constitutional rights, the opinion did nothing to 
disincentivize wayward prosecutors from employing the same 
discriminatory practices.  Without consequences, the dictates of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment go unenforced and defendants and citizens are left 
without protection from unlawful governmental forces.   
 To ensure protection of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court 
should provide a more stringent standard and effective procedures for 
assessing discriminatory peremptory strikes, such as imposing a higher 
burden for prosecutors to overcome in providing a race-neutral explanation, 
reviewing race-based peremptory strikes under the strict scrutiny standard, 
or filming Batson hearings to lower appellate deference.  Moreover, the 
Court in Flowers should have addressed the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct because without penalties, discriminatory practices go 
unchecked and allows future prosecutors to continue without fear of 
punishment.  Thus, without intervention by the Court, defendants and jurors 
are left unprotected and the law is susceptible to regressing back to times 
when the justice system overlooked the problem of invidious 
discrimination.   
 
